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Gregory (c.330-c.395) lived in the wake of tremendous change in the Christian
world. The generation before had witnessed the end of the persecutions of Diocletian (c.
305), beheld the conversion of Constantine and his edict of toleration (313), and
navigated the first wave of the Arian controversy through to the council of Nicaea (325).
These events together created the environment for Gregory’s thought and framed the
central questions for Cappadocian theology.
The council of 318 bishops at Nicaea had been a success for Athanasius’s party
and, for Constantine’s part, had established a feasible precedent for the spiritual unity of
the empire. On both the theological and the political fronts, however, the victory at
Nicaea had not been decisive. The Arian believers within the empire were still
unconvinced by the deliberations and declarations of men in faraway council.1
Constantine himself continued to vacillate between the Arian and Nicene factions
throughout his lifetime, and when he chose the Arian bishop of Constantinople to
administer his deathbed baptism, he anticipated (or perhaps, precipitated) the fortune of
the church for the next half century.
Constantine’s dynastic legacy did not bear the fruit of political or theological
unity that he had worked for: his sons divided the empire again into east and west, Arian
and Nicene. Constantius II (337-361), emperor in the east, supported Arian Christianity
over the Nicene believers, and ten years after the end of the council those who had
celebrated a victory in the church were again out of favor. 2 The Cappadocians and their

1
For a more detailed narration of the development and ongoing nature of the competing homoian
theology, see Lewis Ayers’s nuanced discussion in Nicaea and its Legacy: an approach to fourth-century
Trinitarian theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 100-153.

Anthony Meredith, The Cappadocians (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995):
2. While Constantius II reigned over the empire Jerome made his famous observation that “The world woke
2

1

contemporaries, successors to Nicaea, worked to provide a fuller image of orthodox
belief – clarifying both the nature of the God in which they placed their faith, as well as
the implications of that belief in the world.
Gregory of Nyssa was born at the beginning of the Arian resurgence to an
impoverished, albeit distinguished, family in Cappadocia with deep Christian roots. 3
There are few details about Gregory’s early life, but he revealed in his writing a deep
investment in the life of his family. His youngest brother Peter was a fellow bishop and
his correspondent throughout his lifetime. Naucratius died an early death, but his meek
monastic example prefigured the ascetic piety of his family.4 His famous elder brother
Basil, around five years his senior, had attended university at the school in Athens, and
became an influential monastic and bishop. His sister Macrina, born around 327, was a
tremendous spiritual force – Gregory himself refers to her in rapid succession as a
“good”, “noble”, and “invincible athlete” in faith in his work commemorating her saintly
life. 5 Of Gregory’s illustrious siblings, Basil and Macrina occupied most of his attention,
and he considered both to be his most important academic and spiritual teachers. 6
Although in his early days he had been a lector for the church, Gregory’s first
vocation was a secular career as a teacher in rhetoric (following his father), and he was

up as from a slumber, and discovered itself to be Arian.” St. Jerome, The Dialogue with the Luciferians,
329.
3

Gregory of Nyssa, Life of Moses, xiv. Gregory himself was a third generation Christian, and was
born around 335, the tenth year after the first council at Nicaea. Anthony Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa
(London: Routledge, 1999): 2-3.
4

Gregory of Nyssa, Life of Macrina, 967-968.

5

Life of Macrina, 962, 968, 974.

6

Meredith, The Cappadocians, 52-53. His two great anthropological treatises, On the making of
man and On the soul and resurrection both preserve the enormity of Basil and Macrina, respectively, in
Gregory’s thought.
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presumably married to a woman by the name of Theosebeia. Under the influence of
friends and family - including the third Cappadocian Father, Gregory of Nazianzus – he
sought the monastic life in a community on the Iris established by Basil. 7 His venture into
the contemplative life, however, was not to last. In the end it was Basil’s ambitions,
rather than Gregory’s, that guided his path into formal ecclesiastical affairs.
The imperial support of Arian clergy and doctrine had been disrupted under the
reigns of Julian (361-363) and Jovian (363-364), and ever since the accession of the
Valentinian dynasty (364-) issues of worship and religion within the empire had once
again become matters of maintaining peaceable coexistence within the state.8 One of
Valens’s acts, in order to maintain a balance of power between the Nicene and Arian
parties, was to divide the bishopric of Cappadocia into two. Basil, who had previously
been the sole regional bishop, now oversaw from one of these Cappadocian capitals –
Caesarea.9 Therefore, he appointed Gregory, despite his protests, to a newly established
position overseeing the bishopric of Nyssa around 371. The appointment was an
important move for Basil as it strengthened his jurisdiction in the region as he and other
Nicene Christians once again waited for imperial favor. It was Basil’s hope that Gregory
might confer distinction upon his post rather than the assignment conferring honor upon

7
Johannes Quasten, Patrology, v.3 (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics Inc., 1986): 254-255.
Basil, for a time, lived the ascetic life of contemplation in a community on the opposite bank of his mother
and sister and developed his teaching on the common life of what would become cenobitical monasticism.
Mary Emily Keenan, “De professione Christiana and de perfecetione: a study of the ascetical doctrine of
Saint Gregory of Nyssa” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 5 (1950): 171.
8

Juliette Day, Raimo Hakola, Maijastina Kahlos et. al, eds., Spaces in Antiquity: cultural,
theological, and archaeological perspectives, (Abington-on-Thames, UK: Routledge, 2016): 28. Ayers,
169-171. Meredith, The Cappadocians, 53. Valens and Valentinian together promoted freedom in worship,
although Valens (364-378), the eastern emperor, did maintain the practice of dismissing trouble-making
Nicene bishops during his reign. Gregory himself was exiled in 375 only four years after being established
in Nyssa, only to return after the death and defeat of Valens at Adrianople in 378.
9

Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 4. The other, Tyana, was held by a new homoian bishop.
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him.10 By the end of his career Gregory raised the see of Nyssa to the status that his
brother had envisioned, but Basil would not live to see it accomplished. Indeed, during
his lifetime Basil often complained of Gregory’s lack of political wit, administrative
efficiency, and skill in financial management.11 Nyssen’s lack of attention to the formal
requirements of ecclesial office did not, however, preclude his capacity for theological
and pastoral teaching, nor did it disqualify him as a champion of the Nicene declaration at
the second ecumenical council at Constantinople in 381.
This period, before and briefly after the council at Constantinople, was Nyssen’s
most prolific period for theological work. Just after being established in his bishopric
(371), Gregory wrote his first ascetic treatise On virginity. 12 After his brother’s death in
379, Gregory composed his great series of polemics against neo-Arian theology.
Continuing also on his brother’s exposition of the six days of creation (Hexameron),
Gregory wrote his treatise On the making of man to describe the nature and place of
humanity in creation. Although he wrote primarily to preserve Basil’s memory, the
potency of his thought gained the attention of other Nicene bishops and allowed Gregory
to come fully into his own as a theologian and ecclesiastical leader. 13 Indeed, soon after
Basil his sister Macrina passed, presumably with Gregory at her side. From his final

10

Life of Moses, xiv. Despite what follows, Gregory would indeed distinguish himself and his
bishopric, remembered along with Gregory Nazianzus and his brother, Peter, as “foremost champions of
piety” and bishops of “brilliant distinction.” Theodoret, Ecclesiastical History, 386.
11

Meredith, The Cappadocians, 53. Quasten, 254.
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Quasten, 269-270. Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 5.

Nathan Howard, “Familial Askêsis in the Vita Macrinae” Studia Patristica 47 (2010): 33.
Quasten, 258.
13
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conversation with her, Gregory purports to have recorded On the soul and the
resurrection, writing down his sister’s words as she was “inspired by the Holy Spirit.”14
The religiously turbulent period that had characterized Gregory’s life to this point
had finally ended. With the Arian emperor Valens crushed at the battle of Adrianople
(378) and Arian doctrines condemned by the second ecumenical council under
Theodosius (381), Eunomius and any others not in communion with those bishops
affirming “the hypostasis of three Persons of equal honor and of equal power,” would not
remain in authority over the churches.15 Never again would an Arian ruler preside over
the eastern half of the empire, and the homoian faith – a spent force in the battle for
political hegemony – began to slowly decline and divide. 16
Gregory, for his part, spent the final years of his life exercising his rhetorical
talent, defending established orthodoxy and turning his attention to more pastoral and
mystical theology. He delivered the funeral oration for Meletius, bishop of Antioch, who
had first presided over the council at Constantinople, as well as for the emperor
Theodosius’s wife Flacilla and his daughter. More importantly, however, he was charged
with articulating the orthodox teaching on the Holy Spirit in Pontus – a time in which he

Life of Macrina, 978. When speaking about the dates for Gregory’s works, it is suitable only to
speak of ranges of dates or otherwise those times after certain events in his life provided by internal
evidence in the texts. For a good survey of the studies on the chronology of Gregory’s works, see J.
Danielou, “La Chronologie des oeuvres de Gregoire de Nysse” Studia Patristica 7 (1996): 159-169; s.v.
“Chronology of Works” in Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco and Guilio Maspero, eds., Brill Dictionary of
Gregory of Nyssa, Seth Cherney, trans. (Leiden: Brill, 2010): 153-169.
14

15

Helladius, successor to Basil in Caesarea and Gregory, bishop of Nyssa, are included in a list of
those bishops whom should be considered the defenders of the Nicene faith that emerged dominant. “The
emperor was personally acquainted with all these bishops, and had ascertained that they governed their
respective churches wisely and piously.” Sozomen Hermias, Ecclesiastical History, 382.
“For the Church once being divided, rested not in that schism, but the separatists taking
occasion from the slightest and most frivolous pretences, disagreed among themselves.” Socrates
Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, 128.
16
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either formulated, or likely, committed finally to writing, his treatise on the subject. 17 In
the period following his final refutation of Eunomius, who stood before the emperor
Theodosius for judgement in 383, Gregory composed his most poignant works describing
the spiritual life: the Life of Moses and his Homilies on the Song of Songs. Sometime in
the 390s Gregory passed away leaving a great theological legacy to be upheld by the
following generation of Christians – particularly as the controversies surrounding the
human and divine natures of Christ began to come to the fore. Many valued his position
on the doctrine of the Trinity and his anti-Eunomian polemic, but the influence of
Neoplatonism on his theology was clear. In the final years of the fourth and opening
years of the fifth century, controversy surrounding the theology of Origen erupted.
Because Gregory employed Platonic language and taught on controversial topics in a
manner like Origen (as will be seen in the later discussion of hope for universal salvation
and the nature of the resurrection), his theology came under scrutiny within the church.
However, his work survived the tests of the time, and continued to exercise influence on
later Greek fathers such as Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory Palamas.
Just as Gregory’s theology proper emerges from the ecclesiastical and political
context of his time, his anthropology develops as a reflection of his convictions about the
nature of God. This extended survey of Gregory’s work will introduce first those
elements which became the touchstones for Gregory’s teaching about God - namely his
doctrines of divine infinity, incomprehensibility, and unity of essence and energies – and
then observe out the features of Gregory’s anthropology. The span of his inquiry, as with
any work delving into the meaning behind the terms “divine” or “human” nature, is

17

Meredith, The Cappadocians, 54. Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 4-5.
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expansive, covering the whole of human experience: from the nature of imagehood, the
understanding of sexuality, the composition of the human being, and many other topics
beyond these. It is, however, under the lens of the divine nature that Gregory hoped to
bring into focus the nature of humanity as intended by God, as restored by God, and now
living with God.
A Vision of God
The hallmark of pro-Nicene theology, including Gregory’s, is the belief that there
is only one divine nature, one God, at work:
But in the case of the Divine nature we do not similarly learn that the
Father does anything by Himself in which the Son does not work
conjointly, or again that the Son has any special operation apart from the
Holy Spirit;18
Qualifying this affirmation, however, is the belief that the Godhead is indeed
differentiated into three Persons:
we regard it [the Godhead] as consummately perfect and
incomprehensibly excellent yet as containing clear distinctions within
itself which reside in the peculiarities of each of the Persons: as possessing
invariableness by virtue of its common attribute of uncreatedness, but
differentiated by the unique character of each Person. 19
This is the legacy of Nicaea expressed by Gregory. Individual pro-Nicene
theologians might be said to have different points of origin, and either emphasize (or
present logically first) either the unity or the diversity in the Godhead, but it is true that,
as with Gregory’s distinction of the divine Persons above, these beliefs are the common
attributes of their vision of God.20
18

Gregory of Nyssa, On not three gods, 334.

19

Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, 61.

20

As well as pro-Nicene theologians of the traditional East and West who, in the words of Lewis
Ayers, should rightly be considered together despite the “categories of division.” Ayres, 278-301. Gregory
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Nevertheless, there are distinctions beyond these that characterized Gregory’s
conception of God.21 Gregory’s unique character is most eminent in his expression of
divine infinity, his insistence that the essence - the divine nature - is ultimately
unknowable, and his conception of the divine essences and energies. Gregory employs
each of these principles in turn to preserve the foundational truth of the Christian faith –
communion with the triune God.
The doctrine of divine infinity, perhaps above all other facets of Gregory’s
theology, appears as the expression of Gregory’s desire to maintain the separation
between creature and Creator. Meredith points out that the creature-Creator divide, along
with Nyssen’s claims about divine infinity, are likely resultant from the polemical context
of his early writings.22 His distinction between the creature and the Creator was the
essential point of departure for Anomoeans and neo-Arians, who believed in a
dissimilarity, albeit a homoiousios likeness (if not a hetero otherness), between the Son
and the Father.23 Eunomius contended that the difference in their natures centered around
the Son’s status as Begotten, which implied a divergence from the Ungenerate and
Unbegotten nature of God.24 For the Eunomian party, the essential oneness and simplicity
of the divine nature – to which Gregory also subscribed – necessitated the Father’s

himself seeks to balance in his own thought the concepts of diversity and unity in his opening statements in
The great catechism, lest “in [one’s] contention with the Greeks [they sink] to the level of Judaism” (473).
21

This is by no means intended to indicate that Gregory was the first nor the only champion of
these ideas about God – these traits are those most often emphasized by Gregory in his writing.
22

Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 13-14.

Against Eunomius, 56. “The whole controversy, then, between the Church and the Anomoeans
turns on this: Are we to regard the Son and the Holy Spirit as belonging to created or uncreated existence?”
23

24

Ayers, 146-147.
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Ungenerate character to be the only divine characteristic, as well as being his alone. 25
Therefore, the Son and the Father could both be spoken of in human language in a
manner embodying their essence: the Father as Unbegotten and the Son as Begotten, and,
therefore, a creature.26
Gregory, responding in his polemical treatises, finds this manipulation of the
essential categories of creature and Creator untenable. For Nyssen, the Creator is the
ultimate ground of being. The creature, by contrast, exists only in relation to and by
participation in God, whose nature possesses being. 27 Thus far, both Gregory and his
Eunomian opponents might yet agree: after all, the Begotten nature of the Son could be
said to embody a nominal relation and yet be one of creature and Creator. Gregory points
out, however, that the recognition of God as being one ought to logically rule out the
Anomoean distinction between the two persons, Begotten and Unbegotten as senior
() and junior () beings. 28 Eunomius speaks of the Father as the
“Supreme and Absolute Being,” in contrast to the Son – “another existing through it, but
after it.”29 Eunomius and his followers claimed to still worship the Son as God, but not as

25

Harold Cherniss, The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1930): 36-37.
26
Hans Boersma, Embodiment and Virtue in Gregory of Nyssa: an anagogical approach (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2013): 24-25; 54-55.
27

Han Urs von Balthasar, Presence and Thought: Essay on the Religious Philosophy of Gregory
of Nyssa, “The Concept of Spacing” (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1995): 1-5. Cherniss, 35. Life of
Moses, 13. The great catechism, 498.
28

Ayers, 146-149. Aëtius, Eunomius, and others also tend towards the usage of other names for
the Father and the Son, including the pairing “generate” and “ingenerate” first used by Arius in his Thalia.
When the language of Sonship is used, it is to press further the notion of Christ being “generate” of the
Father and implying an inherent subordinationism.
29

Against Eunomius, 50.
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the Supreme Being. In doing so, however, Eunomius inevitably draws a distinction based
on a measure of some kind, which Gregory characterizes as “spacing,” or diastema,
between the Father and the Son. Some form of positioning would have to be considered,
then deemed correct, and measured between these two immaterial Beings. 30
In response Gregory draws together analogies comparing the length of two reeds,
or, in other places, the comparison of the height at two points on a hill, explaining that
Eunomius considers “the supreme from that which is below, and assigning to the Father
as it were the peak of some hill, while he seats the Son lower down in the hollows.” In
speaking this way Gregory points out the absurdity of the comparison. Gregory asks
where the reed measuring the depths of the nature of the Father might end, and how much
it might exceed the length of the Son’s – or, likewise, how high the hill might be to mark
the divine nature in excess of the nature of the Son. “We get the idea of excess,” Gregory
remarks, “only by a comparison of limits: where there is no limit, we cannot think of any
excess.”31 Regardless of the analogy used and despite the substitution of any pairing of
names, the concept of using a measure to designate the two breaches the defined
principles surrounding Divinity. In other words, Nyssen claimed that it is the creature that
consisted in this realm of the interval, or diastema, rather than God due to the fact that it
was not the Creator. 32 This distinction of interval, or spacing, was the key for keeping
separate the created and the divine.

30

Against Eunomius, 209.

31

Against Eunomius, 51-52.

Balthasar, 3. Indeed, it is Gregory’s contention that any comparison between creature and
Creator is inappropriate and impossible. Therefore, he is similarly unimpressed with arguments that,
instead of comparing the Son and the Father as measures, compare the infinity God with creation itself to
determine the Divine nature. Boersma, 24-25; 42.
32

10

Gregory consistently argues that the concept of spacing, measure (diastema), or
positioning cannot be applied to uncreated Being. Within God there is no movement,
alteration, passion, and certainly no measure in the sense of the categories of time, space,
and quality perceived by created beings whether “in the distinction between his Persons,
or his nature as such.” 33 For God, nothing “is as past or future,”34 and the concept of
spatial position is a “property of the material: but the intellectual and immaterial is
confessedly removed from the idea of locality.”35 The Godhead should be “contemplated
apart from these conditions,” and “is free from the circumscription which is formed by
such categories.”36 As God has possession of being he transcends these concepts, and the
creature is, in itself, embodied within this concept of spacing by its nature. The creature is
itself non-being in essence, which came as called into existence by divine purpose.37
Despite Gregory’s reticence to elaborate on knowledge of the Godhead by placing
it beyond descriptive conception he does not restrict his understanding of the Holy
Trinity to utter passivity. He instead limits his expression to those concepts which
preserve for him the essential divide between creature and Creator. The Anomoean desire
to give expression to transcendent Deity led to the nominal conventions mentioned above

33

Balthasar, 5.

34

On the making of man, 405.

35

Against Eunomius, 51. Later, it will be shown that Gregory distinguishes also between created
and uncreated spiritual and intellectual beings.
36

On not three gods, 335. Balthasar is sure to warn against the confounding of space and time
particularly with the concept of diastema (5-11). While the adiastematic nature of God includes being
without temporal and spatial limitation God also is exempt of all manner of measure. Later the concept of
diastema as it relates to intelligible creation will clarify the way something can be free from measure to a
certain extent but yet be on created side of the divide between creature and Creator.
37

On the making of man, 405. Balthasar, 5.
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and in his letter to Ablabius. Gregory affirms the trouble in this desire to give a name to
that which is “above every name.” He acknowledges that even the term “Godhead” is a
name that imposes bounds of some sort; but “in order then to mark the constancy of our
conception of infinity in the case of the divine nature, we say that the Deity is above
every name.”38 Use of divine names is only permissible in this context of epistemic
humility. In a way similar to the reticent and apophatic expression of Plato in the
Symposium and the Phaedrus, Gregory writes in order to keep the nature of God
unbounded by any opposites. 39 Leaving aside grasping about for the divine nature,
Nyssen points instead to the names of God only as an approach to what has been
revealed. The permissibility of using names like “Godhead,” “Father,” and “Son” is that,
unlike “Supreme Being” and the “other,” these terms denote a comparison based on
personality and relationship rather than establishing interval between the Persons of the
Godhead.
Gregory’s claims about divine infinity lead to the necessary conclusion that the
unlimited nature of the Godhead is beyond the finite scope of human understanding. 40 If
God in his essence is unlimited Goodness, then the demonstrable human inability to
comprehend God is self-evident. Eunomius’s attempt to wholly define the nature of God
as being Unbegotten is one of the chief reasons for Gregory’s elaboration on divine
infinity. Rather than speak directly of the divine nature, Gregory remarks that “no
consideration will be given to anything enclosing infinite nature. It is not in the nature of
On not three gods, 335. Tamsin Jones Farmer, “Revealing the Invisible: Gregory of Nyssa on
the gift of revelation” Modern Theology 21.1 (January, 2005): 72.
38

39

Cherniss, 35; As Cherniss records, “whatever God’s nature really is.”

Andrew P. Klager “Free will and vicinal culpability in St. Gregory of Nyssa’s De Vita Moysis”
Greek Orthodox Theological Review 55.1-4 (2010): 156.
40
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what is unenclosed to be grasped.”41 When Nyssen does speak of the Godhead, however,
it is not in such a way as to eliminate any possibility of knowledge, but rather to maintain
his crucial distinction between creature and Creator. 42 A good way of observing both
Gregory’s apophatic and cataphatic expression in their appropriate tension, then, is his
description of the theophanies of Exodus which he interprets in his Life of Moses.
When thinking of theophanic and revelatory language in Christianity, the biblical
imagery of light comes readily to mind. Most immediately there is the narrative of the
transfiguration of Christ, in which the veil over the eyes of the apostles Peter, James, and
John is lifted, and they together gaze upon the brilliant light of Christ’s divine nature.
Other narratives of divine figures speak about the observer being struck blind, implying a
sort of brilliance that is also linked to imagery of bright light.43 For Gregory in the Life of
Moses, however, the Israelite’s perception of God, and particularly Moses’s experience
with God, proceed in stages of not ever-increasing brilliance and illumination in light, but
rather into an ascent into what is called a “luminous” but “impenetrable darkness.”44
Certainly, Gregory does not exclude the typical schema of divine revelation, as shall be

41

Life of Moses, 115-116.

On the making of man, 390-391. But knowledge of God is “lived and experienced rather than
objectively understood.” Concerning the mix of cataphatic and apophatic elements, see Philip Kariatlis,
““Dazzling Darkness”: The Mystical or Theophanic Theology of St. Gregory of Nyssa” Phronema 27.2
(2012): 99-101.
42

Martin Laird in his chapter “The Luminous Dark Revisited” of Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp
of Faith: Union, Knowledge, and Divine Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) surveys the
debate of the origins of Gregory’s mystical darkness theology and its dissimilarity with Neoplatonic
philosophy; see particularly 174-176.
43

44

Life of Moses, 94; 134.
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seen, but concludes with the peak of divine knowledge existing only in those places
“where the understanding does not reach.”45
The first theophany is the bright appearance of the burning bush to Moses in the
foreign land of Midian. Before conceiving of the presence of God in the bush, Moses
approaches based on the “light brighter than sunlight” which “dazzled his eyes.”46 As
with all humanity, Moses first becomes aware of the phenomena through his sensible
understanding. The ascent he begins on this mountain in Midian is his first step out of the
darkness of ignorance towards knowledge and union with the divine.47 When he
approaches the bush, his mind is prepared for what he is to see, perhaps in an intellectual
sense, by the light – the divine light – that shines on him. This stage of ascent into
knowledge of the divine nature is the first of the three stages of spiritual ascent:
purification, illumination, and unification. 48 This light purifies his mind, his eyes, and out

Life of Moses, 42. The thrust of Gregory’s apophatic theology, particularly in its expression in
the Life of Moses, has been debated heavily. Many scholars are drawn to the unique way in which he
employs the theme of darkness in divine revelation in knowledge (i.e. Danielou’s analysis in Platonisme et
théologie mystique; see also Kariatlis) and take the powerful paradox of the luminous darkness to be the
height of Moses’s ascent. Laird considers Gregory’s theological outlook to be as much a theology of light
as one of darkness, and emphasizes the language of light for the expression of Christian faith. Eubank (see
below) dwells neither in the themes of light and darkness as the summit, nor as a strict succession. Instead,
he acknowledges the paradox as it stands and elevates instead Moses’ encounter with the heavenly
tabernacle. In this view, the apophatic and cataphatic approaches stand together to express the paradoxical
nature of knowing God, but also express the way in which, as knowledge of God for Gregory is beyond the
grasp of human understanding, the human experience of God is primarily mediated through sacramental
realities in a lived faith. “On the contrary, by the use of the analogy of a measurable surface he leads the
hearer to the unlimited and infinite.” Life of Moses, 116.
45

46

Life of Moses, 33.

47

Kariatlis, 105-108. Cherniss, 42-43.

Nathan Eubank, “Ineffably Effable: The Pinnacle of Mystical Ascent in Gregory of Nyssa’s De
Vita Moysis” International Journal of Systematic Theology 16.1 (January, 2014): 27-28. Eubank points out
that these stages, far from being clear and systematic categories in Gregory’s expression, instead run
together. Gregory speaks of the stages of purification and illumination particularly as being cyclical and
reciprocal, and, true to the human experience, being the stages in which one spends the majority of life.
Kariatlis also recognizes the importance of the fluidity of these stages, pointing out that in moral growth,
virtuous living, and katharsis are not prerequisite of knowledge of God, but initiated by revelation.
Kariatlis, 107-108.
48
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of the light comes a request. Part and parcel of this preparation, Moses is prompted to
remove the sandals from his feet, and to come to stand “on that ground on which the
divine light was shining.” 49 Gregory records the first revelation that Moses receives of
God, then, as in a scene filled with light, and of light brilliant enough to dazzle Moses
and draw him out from the darkness – darkness of ignorance, sin, and error – in which he
previously dwelt.50
Having been coaxed from an initial darkness into light, the language of revelation
then changes to a twofold image of lightness and darkness. Preceding Moses’s ascent into
the cloud manifest at Sinai, God leads the Israelites in their journey in the form of a
cloud. Gregory then construes the cloud as an image of darkness as well as the image of
light – the service of the cloud as being shade by day and light by night. In the two sides
of the nature of the cloud the notion that “it was something beyond human
comprehension” is apparent, and later readers learn that Gregory interprets the cloud as
the Holy Spirit. 51 This stage in the ascent, illumination, begins with Moses’s encounter
with the burning bush, but continues in the Israelites being guided in a way that clearly
displays divine eminence. Illumination occurs in the freeing of the mind from all
concepts and notions about God, allowing both Moses and the people of Israel to begin in
their knowledge of God with the understanding that God is somehow beyond the
sensible.52
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Similarly, the image of a “dark cloud” enshrouds Mt. Sinai, with an appearance
like “a fire shining out of the darkness.”53 As before, the motifs of light and darkness
appear together indicating the revelatory nature of the appearance, but the theophany can
still be understood as being beyond the abilities of human comprehension. In this case the
incomprehensible nature of God is indirectly displayed through the response of the
people by the sound of blaring trumpets, smoldering flames of light, and impenetrable
smoke. Moses, elected by the people as a representative due to their fear of the intensity
of the divine presence, then travels up into this cloud, and goes beyond the sight and
comprehension of the people.
Here he enters into “the inner sanctuary of the divine mystical doctrine,” where
Gregory directly states his convictions about the unknowableness of God:
While there he received the divine ordinances. These were the teachings
concerning virtue, the chief of which is reverence and having the proper
notions about the divine nature, inasmuch as it transcends all cognitive
thought and representation and cannot be likened to anything which is
known. He was commanded to heed none of those things comprehended
by the notions with regard to the divine nor to liken the transcendent
nature to any of the things known by comprehension. Rather, he should
believe that the Divine exists, and he should not examine it with respect to
quality, quantity, origin, and mode of being, since it is unattainable.54
The process begun in God’s revelation through the burning bush comes to the
third stage – union – at this point. The notion of darkness may be difficult to understand
as a positive rather than purely negative statement. Indeed, union may appear
inappropriate or “unattainable” given the gravity of Gregory’s apophatic language.
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Moses, surrounded by the darkness of divine presence, and the believer, relieved of all
concepts foreign to the nature of God, dwells in contemplation of God’s divine infinity. 55
That infinity is manifest, however, in God’s revelation of both the law and the plan of the
tabernacle by “divine power.”56 By these means Moses brought to the people a visible
reality of the dwelling of God among them, just as when he descends the mountain he
does so with the clear visible mark of having been in the presence of the invisible God.
Gregory, in describing these events, yet underscores the transcendence of God beyond
human sense, but also affirms that “knowing without knowing” and union with God
could be achieved by divine grace.57
In response to this doctrine of divine infinity and incomprehensibility, Gregory
was open to attack by his opponents, who, misunderstanding his narrative of ascent into
ineffable knowledge claimed he “worshipped what he did not know” (John 4:22).58
Therefore another way Gregory responded to the problem of tension between divine
transcendence and immanence was his doctrine concerning the divine essence and
energies. As will be seen, Gregory believed the energies of God (those revelatory actions
of God in the cosmos) intimated what could be known about the ultimately unknowable
essence (what God truly is). While the energies did not fully reveal the divine essence,
they could not be separated from the Godhead. His expression of the concepts of
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“essence” and “energy” are not as fully developed as later fathers, such as Maximus the
Confessor, Pseudo-Dionysius, or, most notably, Gregory Palamas, but Nyssen does
categorize together the things that can be known (energies) about God: namely the divine
names, the attributes of God, and divine activity and power.59
In his letter to Ablabius Gregory addresses the problems inherent in the use of a
plurality of divine names. As discussed before, Gregory’s intent when using these
concepts, these names, to describe the nature of God is to validate only those things
which can be known. Rather than encompassing the divine essence, they contain
important observations for humans insofar as God relates to the meaning embodied by
those names. “We fashion,” Gregory says, “our appellations from the several operations
() that are known to us.”60 Particularly in On not three gods he speaks at length
on the name Godhead in terms of an objection raised against his Trinitarian thesis: that
using the term Godhead might indicate that one could speak of three Gods, as one would
speak of other plural instantiations of being performing the same operation – he uses the
examples of farmers, or several orators. Indeed, use of the term Godhead tends towards
the expression of multifaceted unity rather than the nuanced unity in diversity which
Gregory sought to express. Gregory’s reply, however, is that “the term “Godhead” is
significant of operation, and not of essence.”61 The triune Godhead in unity performs the
operation, in this example, of “seeing,” which Gregory links etymologically with the term
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Godhead (. This “seeing” is a characteristic which again clarifies God () as
the Triune one, being the Creator, that “beholds” all in their essence, whereas the
creature, who is beheld (), is characteristically unable to conceive of the divine
essence.
This response is characteristic of Gregory’s distinction between essence and
activity. When speaking of God, the transcendent nature, or essence, remains untouched
by human knowledge, but is instead “by its surroundings [the divine nature] is made
known.” Gregory regards the traditional categories of knowledge about God, such as
omniscience, omnipresence, immutability, impassibility, or eternality, as “fit to be
understood or asserted of the divine nature, yet not expressing that which that nature is in
its essence.”62 These characteristics indicate the presence of certain qualities within the
divine essence but fall short of encompassing the whole. Nyssen hoped to reassure his
reader(s) that human knowledge and human speech about God can and should be
according to those appropriate categories – however, they are only helpful to a certain
extent, and serve as points in theological orientation rather than wholly constituting the
divine nature themselves. 63 God is known by his energies but is unknowable in his
essence.
Despite its conceptual prominence, the precise meaning of God’s energies is
difficult to determine in Nyssen’s writing. The divine energy must not, as within his
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responses to Eunomius, become understood as a monolithic movement or group of
characteristics that evoke the same results in all situations. In other words, Gregory’s
opponents believed that if one can observe a variety of effects stemming from the
“energies,” or attributes, of the Father, Son, and Spirit, they might indicate a difference in
essential nature between the three persons. The Father, for example, might be said to
create by His energy, whereas the Spirit’s life-giving power flows from the energy
following it.64 Understanding God’s divine operation in this way allows for the
possibility that differing powers, and therefore differing essences, are at work.
To counter this thought, Gregory repeatedly expressed the unity of nature in the
diversity of activity through the analogy of fire. 65 Fire, which has heat as part of its
essential nature, produces differing effects in the case of different material subjects: wood
burns, mud dries, and metal takes on the heat and luminescence of the flame. Through
this example of plurality in effect stemming from one power Gregory expressed that,
although the divine activity does indeed produce different effects, the Father, the Son,
and the Spirit can be said to share the same power.66 Their activity, rather, is the common
thread which gives rise to human understanding of the unity of the three divine persons. 67
Gregory describes this unity in what can now be recognized as a fundamental expression
of Trinitarian thought, that “every operation,” whether in the “seeing” mentioned before,
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or generally with any divine attribute embodied by the concept of fire above, “has its
origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy
Spirit.”68
This statement, just as with those that begin this section, is the full-bodied
expression of Trinitarian theology which appears in each of the Cappadocian fathers.
While Gregory’s particular emphases of divine infinity, incomprehensibility, and the
concepts of the divine essence and energies have described the underlying foundation for
his vision of God, discussion of his theology would be incomplete without considering
the implications of such a theology. In his On the making of man, Gregory challenges
Eunomius and others like him: “Let those tell us who consider the nature of God to be
within their comprehension, whether they understand themselves—if they know the
nature of their own mind…”69 For Gregory, the task of self-knowledge is one of utmost
importance – one intimately connected with the human desire to know God. As he writes
to his brother Peter in the introduction to the treatise, the nature of humanity is his goal.
Basil had, in his Hexaemeron, explicated a teaching on the creation of the world in the
eponymous six days, but Gregory, surveying the work his brother had done, desired to
expound on one facet: the nature of humanity. After all, humanity had been created, as it
was written, in the image of God. Having qualified some important aspects of Gregory’s
vision of God, the parallels between his theology and his convictions about anthropology
can be discussed.
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Perceiving Humanity
The scope of our proposed enquiry is not small: it is second to none of the
wonders of the world,—perhaps even greater than any of those known to
us, because no other existing thing, save the human creation, has been
made like to God…70
Gregory introduced the concerns he wished to address in On the making of man
with this paradigmatic statement on his theology of humanity. For Gregory, the notion of
humanity created in the image of God was the touchstone for his discussion of any of the
individual concerns which he afterwards laid out. In On the making of man Nyssen
discussed, in light of humanity’s creation in the image of God, the origin and nature of
human gender and sexuality, the relation of the corporeal to the intellectual, the
composition of the human body and soul, and ultimately would give description to the
expansive concept of human imagehood. While Gregory’s theological anthropology
certainly extends beyond the bounds of his expression in On the making of man, the
essential core of his ideas can be grasped from within this oeuvre. Therefore, the purport
of this paper – in appropriately loose fashion – is to follow the conceptual structure which
Gregory established in the preface to explore the connections between the three emphases
of his theology (infinity, incomprehensibility, and the essence-energy distinction) to his
anthropology. In discussing humanity as created in the image of God, Nyssen wrote with
these three categories in mind: “that which we believe [humanity] to be,” “that which is
expected to appear afterwards,” and “that which is now seen”.71
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“That which we believe [humanity] to be”; Imagehood and Psychosomatic Union
Nyssen was certainly not the first of the church fathers to take on the challenge of
writing about the human condition. Much less was he the first to propose definitions and
meanings for the enigmatic but deeply significant idea that God created humanity in his
image. From Irenaeus to Origen and the Alexandrines, and many in between, this area of
theology had been deeply concerning to early Christians. 72 The chief way in which
Gregory interacted with this rich tradition was his distinction between two terms
commonly used in anthropological discussions: that of imagehood and likeness.
Gregory believed that human imagehood was most imminently manifest in the
exceptional human faculty for rational and discursive thought. The “faculty of thought
and reason is incommunicable, and is a peculiar gift in our nature, to be considered by
itself… That alone, the choice product, as has been said, of all our life, bears the stamp of
the Divine character.”73 Humanity, among all the rest of creation, had been designated
with the higher capacity for reason, and because of the other elements of human nature
(which, as shall be seen, humanity shared with other parts of creation) Gregory meant to
distinguish it from all else in the sense that humans were sui generis stamped with the
divine image. It is important, however, to understand that the peculiarity of the divine
image in humanity did not exist separately from the rest of human nature. In a manner
like his description of the divine essence and energies, Gregory believed that “the image
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is not in part of our nature.” 74 The image of God in humanity extended over all other
elements and was inseparable from them, drawing them alike up to God. Furthermore,
Nyssen did not consider the image of God to be limited to only its operation in the
rational faculty, but instead was a plenary expression of a manifold gift.
The perfect form of goodness is here to be seen by His both bringing man
into being from nothing, and fully supplying him with all good gifts: but
since the list of individual good gifts is a long one, it is out of the question
to apprehend it numerically. The language of Scripture therefore expresses
it concisely by a comprehensive phrase, in saying that man was made “in
the image of God”: for this is the same as to say that He made human
nature participant in all good; for if the Deity is the fulness of good, and
this is His image, then the image finds its resemblance to the Archetype in
being filled with all good.75
Beginning here one can begin to sense the distinction which Gregory makes
between the intrinsic image-bearing nature of humanity and the resemblance that can be
(or may not be) seen in accordance with the Archetype. Gregory often spoke in this way
about human resemblance, or likeness, to God as an extension of his convictions about
human virtue and behavior. As above, Gregory believed God to be the fulness of
Goodness, and human goodness to be that resemblance of the ultimate. In some way,
Gregory needed to trace “out the truth so far as [humans] are capable by conjectures and
inferences” of the freedom inherent within human nature, which bred its “pitiable
suffering,” with the “blessedness of the impassible Life.”76 Therefore, it is also important,
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in considering Gregory’s understanding of human likeness, to consider his emphasis on
the freedom of human will and the language of human participation in the divine.
Gregory understood humanity’s possession of free will as paramount to its imagebearing nature. In achieving virtue and likeness to God, humanity works in a
cooperational sense, in synergy with God. 77 Gregory’s Homilies on the Beatitudes reveal
the nature of this process in his thought. Through God’s work in Christ, the grace of
baptism, and the labor of prayer both elements of grace and human effort are present. 78
One might say that God’s work in the incarnation restates the divine work in creation:
both establish the divine image for the ongoing work of humanity to incarnate Christ. In
other words, God works to recreate the human in his image, for “that which was made ‘in
the image’ is one thing, and that which is now manifested in wretchedness is another.”79
In order to restore the likeness of humanity to the gracious height afforded by their
creation in the image of God, humans needed to exercise their will to conform to the
example presented in the life of Christ.
The human capacity for choice laid open the possibility of participation in the
divine image. As Susan Wessel points out, Gregory differed from other church fathers by
his implication that within the soul and the mind, the locus of the divine image, lay an
intrinsic virtuous nature that existed apart from the notion of moral effort and free will. 80
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Despite the blemishes and afflictions that dimmed the appearance of the image in
humanity, the capacity for likeness afforded by being “stamped” with the image
remained. The intrinsic goodness within humanity was part of humanity’s freedom “from
necessity,” but Nyssen also felt that he needed also to express that “virtue is a voluntary
thing.”81 In this way Gregory’s thought was contiguous with his brother in making the
distinction between imagehood and likeness. Basil similarly drew his distinction between
the image and likeness of God in humanity by speaking in the Aristotelian terms of
dunamis (power) and energiea (energy). Whereas humanity had been created in the
image of God the manner of human likeness to God is dependent on their capacity –
ability – to exercise their will and effort to participate in God’s energies. 82 This
conceptual divide fits with Gregory’s understanding of humanity’s telos to grow
infinitely in desire for God. Humanity received in the garden a nature according to the
divine image, but divine likeness is the fulfillment of humanity’s epektatic (eternally
progressive) struggle – to “be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect.” Aghiorgoussis
explains that, for Basil, the image of God is an ontological reality, whereas the likeness is
that ethical calling of which it is humanity’s “purpose to achieve.” 83 The image of God in
humanity provides then, the basis on which humans can grow into the likeness of God.
The Life of Moses presents an excellent opportunity for Gregory to flesh out his
conception of human free will. Not only does Moses, the central character, have to
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exercise his own will in order to overcome his own hesitancy to fulfill the divine
commands, but it also includes the troublesome concept of God’s hardening of Pharaoh’s
heart. At the beginning of our spiritual lives Gregory wrote that one becomes “in some
manner [their] own parents” by choices “moulding ourselves to the teaching of virtue or
vice.”84 Yet again, this exercise is contingent upon the possession of “rational faculties”
that are the “parents” of human virtue, or likeness.85 The thrust of Gregory’s
hermeneutical effort, then, was to preserve the cooperation of human will with divine
will. Even in the case of Moses’s encounter with God, divine presence effected but did
not necessitate his response. Instead, Gregory observes, humanity must apply themselves
“in quietness to higher philosophical matters over a long period of time” to perceive the
truth and have a right understanding of God. 86 Moses, called and cleansed by the light,
had to participate in the freeing of his mind of the false conceptions about God. Only
afterwards did he return to Egypt. As for Pharaoh and the Egyptians, Gregory’s intention
is to repeatedly defend against the ideas of divine coercion and retribution. Pharaoh
experiences a hardening of his heart by God’s permission, his handing him over to his
desires (vis. Rom. 1:21-25), rather than forcing upon him action foreign to his will. 87 If
the passions impose upon human will something foreign to its nature, the question

84

Life of Moses, 54-55.

85

Life of Moses, 55.

86

Life of Moses, 59.

Life of Moses, 69-83. Gregory cogently argues against the idea that God might “forcibly draw
those, who were not inclined to yield” into belief in The great catechism, 497. Klager, 155.
87

27

becomes where, without coercion, human desire to choose the good comes. As Klager
remarks, for Gregory this is a “great mystery.” 88
Because Gregory has much to say about growth in virtue, in likeness, and
participation in divine goodness it might seem that Gregory has a high view of human
capability to choose the good by the exercise of the free will. His view of human creation,
and divine forethought, however, reveal a starkly different picture. 89 In his treatise On the
making of man, Gregory discussed the narrative of creation and said humanity, from its
inception, has an essential mutability. Inherent in creation is a movement from non-being
into being, so that from the beginning humanity existed in a state of change.90 In part this
observation is to draw out the distinction of humanity as a creature and God as the
creator, but it also serves as a paradigm for how Gregory intended to present the nature of
the image of God and the Fall of humanity. Therefore, as Andrew Klager surmises, “the
freedom of the will implies vulnerability and inevitable failure,” and is a divine plant to
allow “at least the prospect of emancipation from the tyranny of death” by creating a
“susceptibility to progress in virtue.”91 Although the chance for human will to achieve
moral progress on its own power leads to inevitable failure, the freedom of the will leaves
open the possibility of change – by cooperation with God’s grace – and capacity to
choose the good.
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Following in this synergistic pattern, Gregory understood human beings as a
composite lying in the middle of the divide between creature and Creator. Gregory
mentioned this blending, this mixis, at the outset of On the making of man, establishing
early on the broad scope of what it meant to be a human person. Created last, humanity
had “as foundations the instincts of a twofold organization, [a] blending [of] the Divine
with the earthy.”92 In order to understand Gregory’s meaning when referring to humanity,
it is important to recognize that Nyssen never considered the intellectual elements of a
human as ever existent apart from the sensible parts. As J. Warren Smith affirms, the
“psychosomatic unity of the person proves central to Nyssen’s anthropology.”93
Gregory succinctly defined a soul in On the soul and resurrection as “a created,
living, intellectual being” with the power, if it is provided with organs, of sensuous
perception.94 Within the soul, however, Gregory distinguished between the parts which
related to the various faculties of the human intellect. The soul in Greek philosophy had
long been considered to have divisions determined by the kind of functions that were
overseen by that part. Aristotelian psychology bifurcated the soul into the rational (logon
echon) and non-rational (alogon) parts, each with their own subdivisions. Platonic
psychology, on the other hand, divided the soul into three parts: the rational (logistikon),
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the spirited (thumoeides), and the appetitive (epithumetikon). Eventually, these traditions
grew together, and the tripartite division was yet acknowledged by many, but they were
interpreted according to a bipartition of the rational and non-rational.95 In Gregory’s
psychology the evidence of these traditions – and their merging – is apparent. In On the
making of man, Gregory spoke in a tripartite sense, where the three parts of the soul he
mentioned were the vegetative (nutritive), animalic (sensible), and rational (intellectual).
Each of these three parts, not to be seen as a “welding” together of three souls, participate
in a unity with one another, each building on the next to create a comprehensive image. 96
Using the same rationale as before with the incomprehensible Trinitarian nature of God,
Gregory advises his reader(s) not to consider the three aspects of the soul as separate as
the ultimately intellectual nature of the soul negates the possibility of conceiving of the
three with their own “limits”. 97 Rather, these aspects ought to be considered as consisting
with one another as a unity. The nutritive soul, responsible for growth and support of the
body, is added on to the sensible soul, which adds sense perception to the vegetative vital
force. Finally, the rational soul perched atop the other two is the foundation of “perfect
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bodily life,” and adds the capacity to partake in reason.98 These three together also stand
as a sort of model for the creative narrative for Gregory, wherein the order of life
introduced to the world proceeds in a similar fashion: first the plants, then the animals,
and, lastly, the creation of intellectually endowed humanity. Practically, however, his
language regarding the soul was often according to the bipartative model. In a manner
similar to the logon echon and alogon distinction, Gregory explains that animals and
plants, although having the appearance of ensoulment, lack souls in the true sense. True
and actual ensoulment requires intellectual rational capability.99 This truer sense of the
soul is that which Gregory speaks of as being the locus of the image and likeness of God:
within the intellectual tier of the soul which is “unchangeable” by its immaterial
nature.100 The two lower tiers of the soul, or non-rational levels, relate most directly the
human senses which facilitate human embodiment. These two tiers allow for the body to
“partake of the animating power” of the soul, and thereby “move by way of growth.” The
connection made in these tiers, if severed, removes from the body the “vital energy,” and
is itself death. Lastly, it is good to again affirm that, rather than being two souls (or even
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parts), Gregory considers these tiers which practically relate to the rational and nonrational faculties distinctives to be united in a single intellectual entity: “the true and
perfect soul is naturally one.”101
Rather than entirely subscribing to either of these views, however, Gregory’s
discussion of the soul must be considered uniquely Christian. There is some continuity,
but the tradition of the Christian community brings nuance to Gregory’s expression.
While Nyssen affirms the Platonic immortality of the soul, he does not affirm its
preexistence apart from the body. The soul’s immortality goes together with the doctrine
of the resurrection - the Christian hope that the soul with the body will rise again.
Platonic thought, by contrast, viewed the separation of body and soul at death to be the
final liberation from a composite form of existence into intelligible simplicity. The
extension of existence as a “psychosomatic whole” would amount to the prolonging of
the “estranged state” of the soul in its “earthly condition.” 102
Indeed, the formal structure and genre of On the soul and the resurrection
displays the use of Platonic thought on the soul (logos peri psyches) and the salient nature
of the church’s doctrine in Nyssen’s teaching concerning the resurrection. Macrina stands
in as the sage teacher of the wisdom of the church, and Gregory, afflicted with passion
and grief, comes to bring the standard objections of the pagan philosophers. As with the
concept of measure (diastema) mentioned before, Macrina brings to Gregory’s attention
the teaching that, likewise, the soul is without measure in terms of “spatial
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dimensionality.” 103 The basic assumption to overcome is the materiality of the soul (as
well as the contrary: if the soul is not material in nature, then it has no existence). 104 Here
Gregory makes an important connection between his theology and his understanding of
the human soul. Although not in the same sense, Gregory considered the human mind to
be like God in its sensible, intelligible, and rational character. Whereas God by his nature
is unmeasurable by any standard, the intelligible part of humanity – the soul – is
unbounded by sensible quality, as well as from operation over through certain organ or
space. Just as in Neoplatonic thought the soul exists in accordance with the analogy of
light: it “illuminates everything without losing anything itself.”105 That is, it operates over
the whole body without being bound by its material nature. Added to this is the soul’s
simplicity and its uncompounded nature, which effectively mirror the unified nature of
the divine essence.
It is important to clarify here that the analogous relation between the divine nature
and the soul only goes so far in Gregory’s thought. He is quick to remind his reader(s)
that, although the soul is that “which our senses [do not] perceive, neither a colour, nor a
form, nor a hardness, nor a weight, nor a quantity, nor a cubic dimension, nor a point, nor
anything else perceptible in matter;”106 in a manner much like the adiastematic nature of
God, that the soul has
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its own peculiar nature [that] is something different from that other [that
is, the divine nature]. Indeed, it would be no longer an “image,” if it were
altogether identical with that other;107
Gregory’s view, over and against the Stoic and Epicurean view, is more similar to
Neoplatonic thought. 108 The Stoics regarded the soul as being material, since there could
not be interaction between a material and immaterial substance. 109 The Neoplatonic view
was that all creation exists as an extension from God, who is, as stated earlier, the
ultimate ground of being.110 Gregory, in similar fashion, regarded
the Divine being… [as] distinctly something other than visible and
material substances, [and] nevertheless pervades each one amongst all
existences, and by this penetration of the whole keeps the world in a state
of being.111
God, however, is not within the being or substance of creation. Rather God is as
the soul to the body – presiding over and connected to the whole, but not contained
within any part of it. Gregory relates this idea through Macrina’s voice in On the soul and
resurrection. 112 She explains, directly stating that she is borrowing the concept, that the
philosophers have proposed the idea of the human being as a microcosmic representation
of the greater kosmos.113 Just as God is over creation, so the soul with humanity.
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Perhaps the most explicit manifestation of the essential distinction and essential
unity of the sensible and intelligible in Gregory’s thought is his proposition of a via tertia
in the medical debate between the Stoic, Aristotelian, and materialist on the location of
the hegenomikon (the ruling principle) and the operation of sense perception. In his
discussion of the human body Gregory employed the terminology and language of Greek
science to describe its function and abilities. Particularly, the concepts of the philosophic
schools and medical diction of Galen shaped the form of Gregory’s discourse, providing
the terms on which Gregory would build to connect his vision of God to those traditional
anthropological debates. For example, Stoic philosopher Chryssippus of Soli held that
sensation occurred as pneumatic emanation struck the sense organs (), causing a
physical reaction-response.114 In a manner similar to Gregory’s theological vision of
human participation in the divine energies, the human being also had by nature an
aesthetic, or perceptive sense through its participation in the body. The divine energies
pointed towards God’s ontological nature in virtue, and the human energy of 
encompassed human perceptive activity, which pointed towards the materiality within
their nature. 115 Human persons participated in the body’s activity through the sensible
capacity stemming from the sense organs, the vehicles of the mind’s engagement with the
sensible world. This participation of the body with the soul, for Gregory, pointed again to
the psychosomatic unity within human nature, as “neither is there perception without
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material substance, nor does the act of perception take place without the intellectual
faculty.”116
Gregory also shared Galen’s notion that the human mind (although he disagreed
about its material nature) interfaced with the sensible organs, as well as the Stoic’s
definition of human perception as the “activity of receiving sensory information.”117 The
open question that lie between these schools and thinkers, however, was where the vital
and operative force resided within the body. The materialist position was that the vital
force physically operated from the brain, which Gregory calls the “citadel of the body.”
The common Stoic and Aristotelian position, on the other hand, believed the
hegenomikon to reside in the heart, perhaps due to “its middle position in the body.” 118 In
both cases, the arguments for each are based on the observable effect which those parts
have on the condition of the body and its operation (energia). If the head suffered injury
there was definite effect on the body’s function. Therefore, philosophers like Galen,
Plato, and Cicero argued on the basis of the correlation between cause and effect that the
cerebral membrane must be the container for the (prohaeresis) “choosing faculty.”119
Likewise, the passionate nature of humanity seemed to flow out of the central space of
the heart to animate the whole body. More than that, the heart’s centrality made it a
plausible location because the two other divisions in the soul, as in the understanding of
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Aristotelians like Alexander of Aphrodesias, were nearby. 120 The moisture and heat of the
body were gathered in towards this center, and therefore, alongside the passionate and
nutritive part, the rational part which contained the hegenomikon resided there also.
Gregory both affirms these observations and postulates his own theory. Instead of
relying on a single source for his understanding, Gregory couched his argument between
the observations of natural philosophy, his apophatic principles, and the scriptural
witness.121 By relying on what he has become aware through “those who spend their time
on anatomical researches” he concurs that the “cerebral membrane… forms a foundation
for the senses” and that the “heart is a sort of source of the fiery element of the body”
which corresponds with the passions. “Yet,” Gregory maintained, “I do not hold this for a
proof that the incorporeal nature is bounded by any limits of place.”122 Because the
functions and observable pathologies of the body do not directly correspond solely to
these parts (which to illustrate Nyssen included a detailed discussion of the operation of
laughter), Gregory instead proposed that the principal authority exists with the
incorporeal mind (nous). The whole of “our bodily organization” is “equally in contact
with each of the parts according to a kind of combination which is indescribable.” 123
Again, what Gregory hoped to avoid was the notion that the human mind had a corporeal
nature, but that the hegenomikon existed beyond the diastemic category of spatial
limitation.
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In order to illustrate his understanding of the communication of the intelligible
mind (nous) and the variety of human senses Gregory proposed the function of a city.
The gates in this analogy are the various ways in which information comes in contact
with the body, and therefore the mind. The sense organs, open to a great variety of
“strangers” and other things that are “mutually unknown,” impart to the body the
differing means by which humans conceptualize qualities associated with outside
objects.124 In this way Gregory also maintained that the ability to collate together this
information into rational concepts indicated intellectual simplicity, rather than implying a
plurality of “minds” because of the plurality of senses. Just as the multiplicity of divine
attributes did not upset the divine simplicity, neither did the senses in the case of the
mind. 125 Nyssen maintained also that, despite being able to point towards the nature of
the human mind due to the human experience of sense perception, “our mind, which is
the likeness of the Creator [who] evades our knowledge, has an accurate resemblance to
the superior nature, figuring by its own unknowableness the incomprehensible [that is,
divine] Nature.” 126 Ultimately the relation of the mind, soul, and body is as mysterious as
the ineffable nature which they resemble. By maintaining that the mind exists in
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communication with the whole body – though not itself a corporeal part – Gregory
preserved the like sense of the presence of God in the kosmos.
The material and immaterial, although they were inherently unified in human
nature, were still distinct in terms of their operation. Gregory considered the body as
strictly the material aspect of human nature. Like his sharp distinction between creature
and Creator, for Gregory there was no crossover of traditionally immaterial elements (e.g.
the soul) into material existence. 127 This did not frustrate the definite unity between the
material and immaterial in his thought, but he did wish to avoid the (primarily Stoic)
philosophic doctrines that the soul or mind required physical manifestation to be present
with the body. Just as with his theological doctrine of the divine essence and energies,
Gregory meant to show relation between the material and immaterial without crossing the
categoric barriers intended for the essence of the human mind and the energies involved
in human activity. The perfect unity of the Godhead in its essence and energies provided
Gregory with a foundational concept for the unity of the human person in its essence and
sensible operation. 128 The operation and essence were not synonymous (as with
Eunomius’s error, confusing the divine attribute of uncreatedness with essential nature),
but were unified. As God’s nature could not be pointed towards without the revelatory
presence of the divine energy, humans – even as their nature was both sensible and

Alexander L. Abecina, “Gregory of Nyssa’s Change of Mind about the Heart” Journal of
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intellectual and corporeal.
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intelligible 129 – could not have true communion with the sensible without a union
between their essence and their energies.
The general milieu of Platonic thought, along with the legacy of theology left by
Alexandrians like Origen, proposed to unify the human organism only in a temporary
sense. Instead of having their unity and creation joined together, they supposed a dual
existence of the mind and the body, where the soul eternally existed before the creation of
the body and would exist eternally long after its dissolution.130 Their conception was one
of eternal creation of human souls by the Logos, which in time led to the embodiment of
the soul. This embodiment was a lowering of the soul’s nature, through which it came
increasingly susceptible to the irrational nature, becoming like the beasts. Gregory mocks
this notion:
They tell us that one of their sages said that he, being one and the same
person, was born a man, and afterwards assumed the form of a woman,
and flew about with the birds, and grew as a bush… he who said these
things of himself did not, so far as I can judge, go far from the truth: for
such doctrines as this of saying that one soul passed through so many
changes are really fitting for the chatter of frogs or jackdaws, or the
stupidity of fishes, or the insensibility of trees. 131
Just as in Gregory’s thought, however, the conviction that the beginning would be like
the end guided the Origenian and Platonic view. The separation of body and soul that
occurred at death led to a reintegration, reunion, with the Logos.132 Gregory, however,
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argued that, on the ground that the Platonic descent of the soul was a precedent for
continual change for the worse, that the migration of the soul from its ultimately
intelligible nature to the non-rational would mean that the soul would eventually change
its essential nature.133 If this change occurred, humans would essentially become beasts.
As will be seen, Gregory’s eschatological hopes for humanity could not allow for their
nature to change in this way, nor abandon ultimately the image of God.
Departing from Origen’s adoption of the Platonic theory of the immortality of the
soul, Nyssen considered the sensible and intellectual aspects of the human person to be
inseparable, having a unity akin to the unity of the Godhead. 134 Consisting of both a
visible and hidden part, Gregory considered the body and soul to exist concurrently, only
and ever being together – life itself being the joint existence of the two together. To
express this, Nyssen compared human life to the way that wheat develops. Though there
are a plurality of aspects (the stalk, the grain, the leaves) within the one form of the plant,
each of them develops conjointly with one another. There may be an order to the
maturity, but the sequence leading to the realization of the plant’s potential comes solely
from the “potentiality of its nature” contained within its seed, not through the external
imposition of another essence. That is, the soul did not come into existence externally
from the body and afterwards come to be embodied – instead the two developed together.
Furthermore, Nyssen’s particular treatment of the human body ought to be
understood as a synthesis between philosophic thought and biblical exegesis, in the same
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vein as Basil’s cosmological teaching in the Hexameron.135 Those things unique to
biblical teaching, most of all the image of God in humanity, Gregory drew out primarily
in terms of scriptural language. Gregory’s discussion of the body using reason, however,
played a supplemental role – further explicating his discussion of human nature and
drawing out theological concepts which followed from his scriptural exegesis. For
example, in On the making of man he describes the sinful nature as heavy in substance,
drawing down the soul to earthly and non-rational things.136 The characteristics of animal
creation – Gregory refers to the nobility of the horse, and the greed of pigs – can be found
within human expression because of humanity’s twofold nature and the body’s
communion with them. This extends beyond his scriptural exegesis of the creation
narrative into a cosmological proof of the necessary nature of the Fall and human
inclination towards sin. 137 Gregory’s questions and answers in On the making of man are
scientific prima facie but are ultimately theologically understood within a framework led
by the scriptural narrative.
Near the beginning of On the making of man Gregory gives theological meaning
to human physiology. The formation of “our nature” Gregory takes as evidence for God
as the great “Artificer,” who arranged both the body and soul “to be adapted for
royalty.”138 For the soul, this is chiefly expressed in its noble and intellectual nature,
whereas Gregory considers the body to be functionally oriented towards communion with
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its Creator. He presented this orientation as manifest through various features: the
uprightness of the human figure allowed for contemplation of what was above rather than
what was below; the use of hands rather than an elongated muzzle also made it
unnecessary for humans to stoop and bow low to the ground in order to feed. The voice,
the “proper adornment” for the rational capability of human nature, serves as the
instrument of the soul, being somewhere between the operation of the flute and the
lyre.139 Furthermore, Gregory considered the freedom afforded human hands, since they
did not support the body’s posture, to be the “special property of the rational nature” of
humanity.140 Human dexterity allowed for precision in cooperation “with the bidding of
reason,” and presented humanity with the opportunity to form written characters – to
create language in likeness to a God who through the Word created the kosmos. These
features, rather than brute strength or natural weaponry, were the means by which
humanity was meant to rule over creation.
At the conclusion of the treatise, Gregory briefly discussed the medical
composition of human bodies. Relating to his earlier explication of the vegetative,
sensible, and intellectual levels of the human soul, Gregory described the human body in
terms of these conceptual tiers.141 The hard and rigid parts of the body, the bones, relate
to the nutritive category and are below the level of sense. Their operation is growth and
stability. Connected to these parts, however, are substances that have a hardness and
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softness to them. This tier correlates to the sensible and facilitate our participation in the
operation of perception. Finally, the soft portions of the body, relying on the other two
levels for their organization and incorporation into the body, sends “into them all that
self-moving and determining force,” or “determining spirit.” Here Gregory is speaking of
the nerves which interface with the sensible parts of the body. 142 Above all these
categories Nyssen naturally elevates the status of those especially significant parts of the
human body, such as the brain, the heart, and the liver. Each of these parts, in turn, rely
on one another (1 Cor. 12) and “no part of it might be left ineffectual or unprofitable for
the regulation of the whole organism.” 143
His purpose in the discussion of the body in this way, however, was to underscore
two essential understandings: first, that the body itself cannot sustain its vital activity on
its own. Instead, again emphasizing the gap between creature and Creator, Gregory noted
that the body “imports from without for the preservation of the living being.” This is
because “the Divinity alone is free from needs.”144 Second, to “show that the seminal
cause of our constitution is neither a soul without body, nor a body without soul.”145 The
genius of the human person is that each part of its twofold nature develops alongside the
other, bringing “about that the Divine image [that] does not at once shine forth at our
formation, but brings man to perfection by a certain method and sequence, through those
attributes of the soul which are material, and belong rather to the animal creation.”146
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Gregory’s conviction is that the body, even in its connection with lower order of creation
it is the instrument of the soul, and the vehicle for concurrent corporeal and intellectual
maturity.147 Furthermore, Gregory believed that the body can reflect the image of God.148
Indeed, the general thrust of his anthropology in On the making of man is an expression
of the instrumental nature of the human body for the human person. 149 The human soul,
Gregory believed, found its fulfillment in embodied existence. Likewise, the body, by its
association with the soul, had ability to share in the nobility of the intellectual nature. At
times the body’s impairments might affect the mind’s capacity to work out the expression
of the image, the image persisted. 150 In other words Gregory regarded the body, rather
than being the sum total of the human person, as intimately connected with the human
mind and only expressive of personhood insofar as it was in a healthy state. Through this
psychosomatic union, the human person “was constituted as a rational, thinking being…
capable of self-determination and of completing the progress of her self-understanding in
relationship to the deity.”151
A last important point of understanding Gregory’s thought on the human body is
his emphasis on the bodily resurrection of humanity. He considered physical resurrection
to have been God’s intent from the beginning. 152 In On the making of man Nyssen
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utilized the precedent set forth in the parable of Lazarus and Dives. 153 Since the two men
are spoken of as still having a semblance of bodily form, Gregory assumes that, in some
sense, that a bodily reconstitution awaits humanity. His teaching is most immanently
revealed, however, in his bedside dialogue with Macrina in On the soul and resurrection,
where the process of bodily resurrection is brought into question.
In Gregory’s view, the bodily resurrection must occur on personal lines: if the
same man is to return into himself, he must be the same entirely, and regain his original
formation in every single atom of his elements.”154 The question that he entertains in the
dialogue is how elements, once dispersed, could come together once again to form the
original. If the soul departed, without the body, the argument could be made that a bodily
resurrection, as Gregory hoped for, was impossible. There would be no means by which
the variety of elements which composed the human body could find their way back into
union to reconstitute a body, much less the body of a specific person. Gregory brought
this objection against Macrina by using the analogy of a ship and a sailor.155 A ship that
wrecks, dissolving in a manner like the body, has its parts cast into disparate parts of the
ocean. The soul, guiding and steering the ship as sailor, has no means to reassemble its
vessel itself. After the wreck, the sailor could at most remain on one part of the ship,
rather than in some way presiding over all the parts and somehow later bring them back
together.
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Macrina responds categorically objecting to the assumptions made about the soul
in the analogy. The soul, in a way like the adiastemic nature of God, was intelligible and
immaterial, and lacked spatial bounds (as discussed before). Therefore, Nyssen, in the
voice of his sister, argued that the soul was not “compressed” inside the body while
constituted, and likewise was not freed upon the dissolution of the body. 156 Instead, “even
though the body is dispersed, it remains in the world, which is itself within the hands of
God.”157 Macrina clarified this point by responding with another analogy. The soul, the
grand artwork of the divine painter, and the elements of the body, like a mixture of hues
of paint, are originally and uniquely constituted apart from all other matter. At the point
of death, however, the tints that made up the mixture according to the artistry of the
painter were dispersed. God, being the masterful artist, remembered “the exact nature of
that colour” which he used to produce each art piece.158 According the pattern which God
had already laid down (the soul) he reconstituted the body. The soul would “persistently
cling to the familiar atoms, until their concourse after this division again takes place in
the same way” at the resurrection.
Overall, it is Gregory’s conviction that humanity, stamped with the divine image
and created as a union of body and soul, is yet ultimately a mystery to itself. Endowed
with the capacity for divine likeness and existing as a unity of diverse operations, human
nature’s inherent potential had to be realized through the divine restoration
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() of all humanity and growth into beings infinitely desiring
() the infinite God.
“That which is expected to appear afterwards”; and 
When he spoke of the fate of humanity, Nyssen’s belief rested on his conviction
that “the resurrection promises us nothing else than the restoration of the fallen to their
ancient state.”159 Beyond the hope of the resurrection, he believed that humankind had a
destiny that, by divine power, would involve their remaking into the image of God.
Staying in rhythm with his convictions about humanity’s imagehood and essentially
embodied nature, Gregory believed that humans would be restored to the manner of their
existence prior to their fall into the habitual nature of sin. Natural image-bearing would
give way to infinite growth () in likeness, and human bodies would “be
restored… with a brighter and more entrancing beauty.”160
Gregory’s expression of this belief, and his discussion of restoration
() placed him nearby to others (under the broad umbrella of
“Origenism”) who fell under the anathema of the second council of Constantinople in
553.161 The anathema itself evinces that Gregory was not alone in his speculative venture
into discussion of a final restoration. Other church fathers, most notable among them
Origen of Alexandria, had developed a theology of hope based on the expectation of the
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universal restoration () of all created things. Therefore, to
understand the connection of Gregory’s theological anthropology and the future he
anticipated for humanity, one ought to observe those points of Nyssen’s similarity and
departure from the thought of Origen and the other Cappadocian fathers.
Origen was the most expansive and thorough of those theologians who wrote
concerning apokatastasis. Although it can be difficult to discern the elements of Origen’s
actual belief from the influence of his thought upon later Origenist theologians, there are
certain emphases which distinguish his view of universal human restoration. 162 His
claims for the final restoration centered primarily around the importance of his
Christology to his overall theology. Christ’s victory over death rendered it eternally inert;
Death, as a spent force, could no longer lay claim to human life even in the eschaton. The
resurrection of Christ, who was himself a human being, ontologically changed the fate of
humanity by their subsisting eternally in the body Christ. 163 Instead of being the fate of
only those who in this life were grafted into the body of Christ, the apokatastasis of
Origen entailed an end in which God became “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28). The suffering of
humanity in the resurrection, spoken of by Christ, would yet occur, but the fire to which
he referred would be purifying in nature (1 Cor. 3:11-15). There would be, in the
eschaton, punishment and reward. Rather than humans undergoing either punishment or
reward, Origen believed that any human experience of punishment administered by
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God’s judgement – the fires of hell – would be towards the end of receiving a reward.164
Origen was unwilling to consider hell and heaven in the same ontological category. He
considered God, along with Gregory and the Platonic thinkers, to be the grounds of
being. The eternal nature of hell could not be said to be parallel to the eternity of a life
with God in heaven.165 A final and important point of Origen’s eschatology was his belief
in the monadic nature of the beginning and ending of existence. Human restoration was a
return to a pre-existent spiritual state in union with God because, as mentioned before, he
subscribed to the Platonic belief in the pre-existence of souls in the intellectual realm
prior to their embodiment. Therefore, the end of human existence for Origen was
likewise an intellectual and bodiless existence, achieving in this way unity with God over
infinite ages.166
Basil had a more critical view of Origen’s theology than the other two
Cappadocian fathers. Brian Daley argues that Basil’s disagreement largely stemmed from
his understanding of the “importance of the prospects of judgement and retribution in the
moral life of Christians.”167 This concern, although expressed less harshly, was one that
Nyssen shared. Basil’s critique tended to use more traditional imagery when teaching on
salvation and eschatology. These were meant to prepare his listeners, training them to
resist the temptations and passions. Basil’s continuity with other Christian thinkers comes
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mostly from his tendency towards spiritualizing the language of the scriptures and
willingness to leave the nature of the final days in abstract language and apophasis.168
Gregory the theologian, or Gregory of Nazianzus, spoke in a more cautious way
than Origen, but yet appreciated many of the facets of his theology of hope. Nazianzus
also expressed the notion that sin as ontologically meriting a suffering, rather than God
himself being the source of the punishment of the sinner. His belief was that sin brought
about an eternal shame and suffering through alienation from God.169 Therefore, the
sinner, in the eschaton, would undergo a remedial or purifying suffering – similar, but
changed slightly from Origen’s therapeutic and pedagogical view. He also expressed the
time of restoration () as the time in which humanity would be wholly
receptive of God by using the language of God as “all in all.” 170 The greatest differences,
however, laid in Nazianzus’s theological polemics against Novatianist rigorism. In
combating the notion that post-baptismal sins were not covered by the blood of Christ, he
emphasized a two-fold notion of salvation that at the same time affirmed the efficacy of
the baptismal water and also underscored the processive nature of salvation. His
soteriology was, as will be seen with Nyssen, an anthropologically driven understanding
of soteriology. Nazianzus preferred to talk about the salvation of all in connection to
human imagehood and formation into the divine image, setting an important precedent
for the concept of theosis in Christian theology.171 As with Origen, the importance of
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Christ played a central role, but Nazianzus’s emphasis lay in the transition of humanity
from the Adamic type to that of Christ as a model for the salvific narrative.
The restoration for which Gregory hoped can be distinguished from the views of
these other theologians most poignantly by identifying the nature of Gregory’s view of
Christian life – both in the present spiritual life as well as resurrection life. Therefore,
before delving into the larger concept of apokatastasis and Gregory’s understanding of
the resurrection, it is necessary to lay out some examples of one specific portion of his
hope: the concept of infinite progress, or .
Between his doctrine of divine infinity and human mutability, Gregory used his
thoroughly theological understanding of anthropology to describe the human spiritual life
as progressive growth in contemplative desire for God. “[The] Divine is by its very
nature infinite, [and] enclosed by no boundary,” in a manner similar to human perfection
in virtue: “in the case of virtue we have learned that… its one limit of perfection is the
fact that it has no limit.” 172 As Everett Ferguson states, “The infinity of God is the basis
for the infinity of virtue.” 173 The idea that perfection lacks limits, therefore, implies a
degree of unattainability in a manner similar to divine infinity implying divine
incomprehensibility. This should not, however, preclude human effort for growth in
knowledge of God, nor slacken human striving for growth in virtue. Instead, a practice of
perpetual progress, little by little, will allow humanity to grow. This epektatic growth is
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“through exertion,” and, in the case of virtue, is analogous to the exercise of a muscle.
Though the task of attaining Godly virtue is beyond human grasping, “this kind of
activity alone does not slacken its intensity by the effort, but increases it.”174
With this acknowledgement, however, Gregory remained convinced that human
effort alone could not be responsible for epektasis. First, the “nature of the Good” was to
attract “to itself those who look to it.”175 After all, Gregory believed that since humans
had a conception of virtue and had seen that virtuous action does occur, that such
behavior was immanent evidence of humanity’s created goodness and origin with God.176
Therefore, due to the connection between divine and human nature, a sort of synergism in
epektatic growth emerged in Gregory’s thought. Next, Gregory described the manner of
this cooperation as the result of “long training and supernatural illumination.” God
provides spiritual assistance “at our birth,” but also is alongside human effort “whenever
we apply ourselves to diligent training in higher life and strip ourselves for the more
vigorous contests.”177
Beginning in this life, humanity could grasp after material or spiritual desires.
Both desires operated along the tracks of human mutability – the material desires would
grow like the spiritual ones if indulged but could not sustain perpetual progress due to the
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limitation of evil. 178 The spiritual desires, by contrast, grew in strength, but also
progressed in a manner unchecked by limits, even into the time of restoration. This
marked a departure in Gregory’s thought from the Platonic notion of rest in the time of
reintegration of humanity with the divine. 179 Instead, the end would be like the beginning
of humanity: as creatures drawn from non-being into being, humanity would continue in
motion towards the unreachable heights of divine knowledge and virtue. In attaining to
the heights, humanity would also come to grow into a greater likeness of God. As within
the preface to his Life of Moses, Gregory supposed that the “perfection of human nature
consists perhaps in its very growth in goodness.”180 Humanity participated by way of the
energies of God ontologically to come into being, and so also their continued being
related to their participation in the energies of God through their progress in virtue.
Gregory held that human participation in the divine life was most eminently
secured by the incarnation of Christ. In her article on epektasis, Kristina Robb-Dover
recognizes within Gregory’s thought the centrality of Christ in human ability to
participate within the divine oikonomia.181 In the Life of Moses Gregory presents several
images of Christ’s presence which embody his integral role in human epektasis. The most
emphatic of these images is Moses’s security in his viewing of God by way of the “hole
in the rock” which is Christ. 182 In Moses’s desire to see God face to face, he expressed
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his desire to progress to a height infinitely beyond human capacity. God, acquiescing to
Moses’ request, allows him to see himself in some sense. Gregory interprets:
This truly is the vision of God: never to be satisfied in the desire to see
him. But one must always, by looking at what he can see, rekindle his
desire to see more. Thus, no limit would interrupt growth in the ascent to
God, since no limit to the Good can be found nor is the increasing of
desire for the Good brought to an end because it is satisfied.183
Mysteriously, the growth and ascent which Moses undertook Gregory understands as
progress achieved by “standing still.” Being both perpetually in motion as befitting a
creature and resting on the Rock which is Christ in a manner befitting the motionless
creator, Moses came to “see” God, and thereby became radiant. The movement and
participation of human persons in the divine nature “comes only to the degree that she
apprehends and embraces her need for Christ.”184
This participation, in Cappadocian thought, is one of the chief elements of the
spiritual life. Humanity’s taking on of the attributes (or participate in the energies of) God
allows them to become through the exercise of virtue and will that which God is by
nature.185 The idea of divinization (theosis) emerges also in Gregory’s Homilies on the
Beatitudes, where he speaks of how the process of divine participation is not restricted
only to the life to come, but rather has its beginning in this present life. Participating in
the virtues outlined in the Beatitudes are the starting point for the divine work of
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divinization in one’s life.186 This process, rather, than being completed, goes on even in
the life to come. This does not remove, however, the reality of Christ’s saying “Blessed
are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Gregory might say that when Christ
preached on the Beatitudes he spoke truly by expressing the eschatological reality of the
peace and comfort of the life to come but expressed also the ongoing nature of that
blessing as being part and parcel of ongoing life with God. To be clear, Gregory
understood that this life as existing not only “in the eschaton, but in the present.”187
Gregory’s doctrine of apokatastasis signified a return to humanity’s angelic state,
which was from the beginning God’s intention. This return, however, should not be
understood as a reversion, but a return with maturity – what Smith calls the “fulfillment
of the germinally perfect form.”188 Humanity in the garden had been created in the image
of God, and the universal restoration of humanity would be the ultimate act to secure
human likeness and union with the divine energies (vis. Philippians 2:10). Gregory’s
understanding was that since evil and death were by nature non-substantive, that in the
final restoration they would cease to be – since God would become (as with Origen) “all
in all” there would be nothing left to serve as a vessel or container of the emptiness of
sin. 189
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Acknowledging the nature of non-being in sin and wickedness does, however,
raises the question of its origin and association with human beings. As discussed before
with the nature of the passions and virtues, it must be stressed that the passions, unlike
evil and sin,
have not been allotted to human nature for any bad purpose at all (for the
Creator would most certainly be the author of evil, if in them, so deeply
rooted as they are in our nature, any necessities of wrong-doing were
found), but according to the use which our free will puts them to, these
emotions of the soul become the instruments of virtue or of vice. 190
For Gregory, God’s foreknowledge of humanity’s fall comes not from his
foreordained will that humanity sin, but rather that since humanity is created, their
coming to be involves the movement from non-being into being. That precedent of
change within human nature led to (but did not necessitate) the Fall. 191 Therefore, instead
of guilt being ascribed to one who sins on the basis of their own errors (which, as
discussed before, Gregory sees as inevitable) it is instead ascribed by “proximity to the
offense” which is death and non-being.192 Generally, Gregory’s approach to sin is to
consider it a wound, and that humanity needs therapeutic care to attain to life. The wound
of sin can fester and deepen if left unattended, and humanity itself has need to take divine
medicine.193
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Gregory clarified his understanding of evil and death’s nature of non-being by
comparing the effects of our proximity to it as to a flame in three stages of succession:
desire (), pleasure (), and passion ().194 In the first stage, desire,
humans are attracted by the means of their senses to something that is understood and
seen. The continual presence of that which attracts our desire breeds pleasure, which
leads to a lenience in the will. After an increasing period of lenience, the pleasure grows
into a passion that draws the afflicted even in the absence of the desire. Desire itself,
alongside the patient, is put to death by the growth of the passion. 195 Thus the progressive
decline of a human into sin can be understood as being consumed by fire. The being, its
desires, and its passions alike may burn for a time, but come to their end by settling back
into non-being.
The separation and non-entity inherent in the presence of pathology should also
be understood within the context of Gregory’s engagement of the term in its medical and
philosophic context. Galen, in his discussion of described it as the kind of
unnatural motion that comes from outside whereas the “energy” of an object described
the motion of an object that emerges from the object. 196 Gregory, adopting the notion,
agreed that pathology indicated states in the body (and the soul) that were external to
nature, but wished to maintain the distinction between the state of the body and the soul.
He considered viciousness and sin as later occurring infirmities, as invaders, to the
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natural state of human being. 197 If a pathology affected one or the other, Greek
philosophy would question how they could be said to be distinct but related. Gregory’s
response was to treat the notion theologically. The human mind, in its comprehension of
the divine, acted as a mirror – subsisting as an image only insofar as it continued to
“remain in likeness to the archetype.”198 The body, in a similar fashion, operated as a
mirror for the mind (), and reflected its essential nature only insofar as its archetype
– in this case, the body’s archetype being the complete union with the mind while in the
state of perfect health. Gregory believed that perfect bodily life “is in the rational (I mean
the human) nature, which both is nourished, endowed with sense, and also partakes of
reason and is ordered by mind.”199 If a human being, falling into the pathos of sin,
obscured the image of God within them, their operation as a mirror for the divine energy
was disrupted. The human body, when it fell into a physical pathology, obscured its
operation as a mirror for the human mind. In this way, Gregory applies the concept of
essence and energies which he first applies to explain the divine nature to his
understanding of the human relation of the sin as a pathology to the unity of the body and
mind. Each link in this chain of images, in this diminishing progression of mirrors, were
distinct because, despite the disruption that could occur within the chain, the operation of
the chain of mirrors was in one direction: downwards. That is, when obscurity due to a
pathology occurred in the human mind or soul, it reflected down the chain into the
immanent physical image of the body: “for the mind takes the lead, and chooses the
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expedient course by reason and not by passion, while their nature follows in the tracks of
its leader.”200 The divine nature, however, remained untouched because of its
transcendence of the human image, despite the divine image remaining within the
(obscured) human. Similarly, with the human relationship with the body and the mind,
the obscurity caused by physical pathology marked a departure in physical reality from
the healthy image of the human body present in the mind. Thereby, the human mind’s
intelligible nature allowed it to withdraw from and transcend the pathologies of the body,
all the while subsisting with it. 201
Thus, for Gregory, sin and evil must be discussed in terms of privation of good, in
a manner like discussing cold as the absence of heat or darkness as the absence of
light. 202 The wickedness that has beset human nature (as with Origen and Nazianzen)
could not be considered on the same essential level as the goodness of God. The
unchanging and infinite nature of God, being more firm and substantive, overcame the
finite and mutable nature of humanity that would “not remain settled even in evil.”203 As
with the discussion of epektasis above, the final state of humanity would continue to be
that of motion – but the creative intent of infinite motion towards God would be realized.
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The non-rational impulses that assisted in our growth in virtue, such as the desire
spoken about in On the soul and resurrection, would no longer exist within human
nature.204 They will be peeled away as they are no longer needed for assistance in
drawing humanity toward God. In a similar way, Nyssen speaks in On the soul and
resurrection of the “coats of skins” that will be laid aside at the final restoration.205
Certain qualities of bodies, such as sexual differentiation (vis. Galatians 3:28), growth,
and aging will be laid aside in favor of “something more subtle and ethereal.”206 Gregory
comments that “it does not seem to me that our hope is one for those things which are
now subjected by God to man for the necessary uses of life, but one for another kingdom,
of a description that belongs to unspeakable mysteries.”207 The emphasis in his thought
lies in the understanding that, although these aspects of embodiment may continue on in
existence, their functionality will no longer be needed to secure union with God.
Because God created humanity in his image Gregory had to reconcile his concept
of imagehood with the reality of human existence, including its division into male and
female. This involved heavy exegesis in On the making of man of the passage in Gen.
1:26-27, where Gregory interpreted the divine act of creation. 208 J. Warren Smith argues
that Gregory views God’s separation of humanity into gendered existence is the result of
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his anticipation of the fall. Rather than intending from the beginning that humanity exist
as male and female, God created humanity according to his image with the intent that, in
the eschaton, that they live in a manner like the angels. As Gregory specifies, “He
devised for His image the distinction of male and female, which has no reference to the
Divine Archetype, but, as we have said, is an approximation to the less rational
nature.”209 Therefore the distinction of gender is an aspect of divine accommodation in
Gregory’s thought. God would not have established gender differentiation among humans
in this sense if he had foreknown that humanity would not fall. 210 In comparison, Basil
believed that humanity’s imagehood and likeness stood further apart from bodily
existence. Therefore, when he speaks of gendered humanity, Basil speaks of the one
nature of human virtue, and likewise one calling to divine likeness. Since the body is not
directly involved in the image of God, male and female alike are “absolutely equal.”211
With respect to the equality of the presence of image and calling to likeness, Gregory
would certainly agree.212 The emphasis of his theology, however, demanded that he also
account for the whole of human nature, including the body. Christ in the incarnation took
on the whole of human nature, including gendered existence, in order to make the whole
of humanity subject to God the Father. For Gregory, as discussed before, this wholeness
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(naturally) has reference to the entirety of humanity corporately, but also extended
incarnationally to include all of humanity corporeally. 213
Humanity, according to Gregory, could have continued in a manner like the
angels (that is, both in a state different from present as well as without the need for sexual
difference) indefinitely, but yet remain an embodied composite of an intellectual and
corporeal nature. Created human nature, then, has within it the two-sided nature
discussed before with the additional sense that the rational part is undivided and that the
corporeal part is (sexually) divided in a manner like the animals. Smith clarifies that
humanity was not created in two separate creative acts, but a creation of a “double aspect
of human nature” where the qualities which define the rational and non-rational parts
occur before and after one another “only at the level of God’s intention.” 214 As Gregory
puts it, God’s creation of “man” is according to the “indefinite character of the term,”
which in turn should include “all humanity” in the “first” of these two aspects of creation.
God created “universal humanity” in its “consummation” logically first; the second
aspect of human nature, apparent in Adam’s “heavy corporeal existence”, is “the thing
formed of earth… the man ‘of the earth’ [].”215
Therefore, the passionate, or earthly, character of human sexuality of which
Gregory wrote came not out of human inability to tame the passions but from its
inception in kinship with the animal creation. Human sexuality does, however,
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accommodate sin insofar as both the hypersensuality of procreation and sin share what
Smith calls a “sensual orientation.” 216 This orientation is characteristic of the nonrational, or appetitive, aspect of the soul discussed before. Sexuality, for Gregory, is not
by its nature sinful, but it does increase the desire of humanity for non-rational things and
causes the intellect frustration in seeking to become more reflective of the divine image
rather than the image of the non-rational animals which it takes on. 217 Sexuality and sin
have connection in Gregory’s thought, but the former is not cause for the latter. These
desires, or passions, are necessary for moral action in this life, but they do not compose
the imagehood of the human soul. 218 Indeed, in the life to come, Gregory implies that
gender and sexuality, as with other accretions that exist only in this temporal life, will
cease to be significant in the eschaton. 219 Gregory concludes his thoughts with a
characteristic statement of apophasis:
The cause, indeed, of this device, only those can know who were eyewitnesses of the truth and ministers of the Word; but we, imagining the
truth, as far as we can, by means of conjectures and similitudes, do not set
forth that which occurs to our mind authoritatively, but will place it in the
form of a theoretical speculation before our kindly hearers. 220
The presence of human sexuality and other physical characteristics did not
disqualify for Gregory, however, the truth of a bodily resurrection. The body that we take
on in the resurrection will be similar to the one that we had in this life, both in terms of
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their form and their substance. As Susan Wessel states, Gregory believed the resurrection
would be a “complete restoration of the individual characteristics of the human person,”
including the mind and the body: the whole person.221 Gregory considered this
conception of the human person to combat the Platonic (as well as Origenian) belief in
the transmigration of the soul and eventual bodiless existence in apokatastasis.222 Their
understanding that the resurrection implies a separation and dissolution of the current
body is correct, but it is, Gregory insists, “that the same body again as before, composed
of the same atoms, is compacted around the soul” in the final restoration. 223 For both
Gregory and the Platonic thinkers, the beginning of existence would be like the end.
Gregory, however, contended that the beginning of human existence was an embodied
existence. If it were that the soul came to dwell on its own in an ethereal reality apart
from embodied existence, there would be no reason that that ending state would not
relapse into the cycle of embodiment.224
There remains an open question on the interpretation of Gregory’s writings on the
passions, the emotions, within human life and virtue. Some have argued that his teaching
is that of Greek apatheia, or of a mortification of the passionate drives to pursue instead
the higher things of the spiritual life.225 Reading through Gregory’s more ascetical
writings – in his praise for his sister, Macrina, or his treatise On virginity – could lead a
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reader with the impression that Nyssen prized an impassible life. The Stoic philosophers
held this view of the emotions, and this view was not without its admirers among the
church fathers.226 Some scholars have argued that Gregory, however, would likely agree
more with the view expressed by Platonic philosophers, perhaps most well known as the
analogy of the charioteer. 227 The charioteer, understood as human capability for free will
and rational thought, the Platonic logistikon, has two horses reigned into her chariot: one
horse, a strong and upstanding beast symbolizing spirited human nature – human ability
to experience higher emotions like honor and courage; the other, a wild and untamed
horse symbolizing desirous and appetitive human passions. 228 Without the participation
of both horses under the control of the charioteer, the vehicle will not operate properly. If
one is removed, the ability for the chariot to navigate is direly impaired. Here the
objective is not passionlessness, but restraint and control over human emotion. The
feeling of sorrow for sin, anger in sight of injustice, or desire for the higher divine life are
each examples of human passion properly restrained.229 The passions, for Gregory, have
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a tenuous relationship with human virtue – leaving open the possibility for virtue by
exercising control over them, but not being part of the image of God in humanity.
Therefore, while necessary for growth in this life, the passions will not continue to have
meaningful existence (as discussed above with human sexuality) in the restoration of all
things.230 Instead, God will become “all in all,” superseding the expediency of current
human existence.
Lastly, Gregory’s understood human will and destiny guiding a person not
towards one of two locations, but instead to that of one eschatological reality that humans
experience differently based on their “ontological composition in either passions or
virtue.”231 In the Life of Moses Gregory illustrates this idea through the plague narrative.
The Egyptians and the Hebrews, both living in Egypt, experienced the power of God in
their own ways. For example, in the plague of darkness, Gregory writes that
Perhaps someone, taking his departure from the fact that after three days
of distress in darkness the Egyptians did share in the light, might be led to
perceive the final restoration [] which is expected to take
place later in the kingdom of heaven of those who have suffered
condemnation in Gehenna. For that darkness that could be felt, as the
history says, has a great affinity both in its name and in its actual meaning
to the exterior darkness. Both are dispelled when Moses, as we have
perceived before, stretched forth his hands on behalf of those in
darkness… [Which became] for those others also the healing of pain and
the deliverance from punishment. 232

“Whenever this happens, then, there will be no longer need of the impulse of Desire to lead the
way to the Beautiful… the soul should be free from such emotions, and turning back upon herself should
know herself accurately what her actual nature is, and should behold the Original Beauty reflected in the
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In this way Gregory’s view of the restoration of all things is one of therapeutic
hope rather than a vision of final retribution. Certainly, both punishment and reward,
heaven and hell, are realities for Gregory. 233 The power and love of God will become
immediately manifest to all humanity in the apokatastasis, but for the sinner these will be
experienced as pain. Nyssen viewed the suffering and punishment, however, as directed
toward the end of rehabilitating the sinner.234 Moreover, the suffering experienced for this
restoration was not imposed by God, but instead was a preservation of the freedom of
human will. 235 God’s justice “follows” the free will of the sinner, as “each man makes his
own plagues when through his own free will he inclines toward these painful
experiences.”236 The lover of God, however, experiences deliverance, true freedom, and a
satisfaction of their desires: to ever pursue God to greater heights.
Redeeming “that which is now seen”; sacramental and ascetic practice
To this point Gregory’s view of the beginning of the life of virtue, the immediate
practice of ascent in this life, has appeared in comparison to the original and final states
of human nature. This is as it should be. The meaning of the Christian way of life, the
practice and living of the faith, are senseless without purview to both their foundations
and aims. These teachings are, however, lifeless if left without discernable the imprint
upon the experience of the body of Christ, the church, incarnate in the world.
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Human life, immersed in the created order, needed some way to be drawn up to
God in order to participate in the salvation effected by Christ. Gregory believed human
nature itself underwent a kind of transformation at the incarnation. When the Son had
become human, God became flesh, a movement within humanity had emerged. Similar to
his conviction about the pervasiveness of the mind over the body, Gregory believed that
Christ through the incarnation evoked a “sense felt at once by the whole system.”
Humanity, together counted as one person, had God’s nature fully revealed to it in Christ.
His taking on of flesh and sharing in that nature caused the “resurrection principle” to
pass through “the entire race, being imparted from the Member [Christ] to the whole.”237
Though humanity would not in this lifetime attain to a full imitation, the journey began
by participation in the practices that Christ established in his own life.
Gregory described the church’s celebration of the Eucharist and the practice of
baptismal regeneration as the means of the church’s pursuit of likeness to Christ. “The
sacraments,” remarks Boersma, “constitute the initial transposition” of human life into
the divine life.238 Christ, taking on human nature, began this process of transposition.
Gregory believed that Christ had “realized an actual fellowship with man, and has
effected life as a living fact, so that by means of the flesh which He has assumed, and at
the same time deified, everything kindred and related may be saved along with it.”239
Nyssen considered Christian baptism as a “mystery of regeneration” by which
human persons were established on the “foundation of life.” 240 By immersion in the
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waters of baptism, the believer imitated Christ and participated in his death, burial, and
resurrection. The sins and trespasses of the former life passed away and were put to
death. The transformation of human life began in this act of imitation, which engaged the
whole of the human person. The water itself, present to appease the human senses,
communicated the human need for salvation in both body and soul. 241 Since the human
person was a psychosomatic whole, the believer experienced “by means of the cleansing
in the water” a participation “in Purity; and true Purity is Deity.”242
Here, again, Gregory’s understanding of human synergism presents a paradox
inherent in his understanding of participation. Human sharing in the life of grace lie
between being of “the work properly belonging to the Divine energy” and being
“dependent on the power of him who is being borne.”243 Certainly God’s involvement in
the rebirth of the believer could not be questioned, but Gregory clarifies the manner of
human participation in baptism as being through both prayer, performance, and surrender.
Before immersion prayer lifted the believer in an “invocation of heavenly grace.”244 This
invocation presented the believer to God, and in manner like the raising of Christ on the
cross. Next the “descent into the water”, or the burial of the sinner, is performed as a
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“trine immersion” that models the three days in the tomb and the three persons of the
Trinity.245 Finally, the individual surrenders to divine power by “either themselves
[making] an actual addition to that grace, or at all events [not causing] the existing grace
to miscarry.”246 That is, in the spiritual life that begins for the believer after being raised
from the water, the effort required of the Christian is a passive sort, which admits of the
efficacy of divine power and attempts to not impede the ongoing work of the Spirit.
Following initiation into resurrection life, the believer requires nourishment to
mature and grow up into the salvation granted in baptism. With this need for nourishment
Gregory advances the idea that humanity is a twofold entity which partakes of the
Eucharist for integration of the body into the incorruptible life. Through baptism the soul
is “fused into Him through faith,” but the “body comes into fellowship and blending with
the Author of our salvation” through partaking in “that very body which has shown to be
superior to death.” 247 The body of Christ, itself deified human flesh, worked in a manner
similar to the sense of baptism mentioned above in that the sharing of the believer in the
Eucharist was an assimilation of one element of a larger body to produce a transformed
whole. Therefore, the Eucharist for Gregory is a matter of transformation (metapoiein,
metastoicheioun) of the infinite into the finite, and the finite to the infinite.248 The infinite
God, taking on the finite nature of humanity, translates the finite human capacity for
spiritual maturity into an ever-greater longing. By partaking of the body and the blood of
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Christ the believer “constantly expands the capacity of one’s mind and its desire for
God.”249
As the believer partakes of the Eucharist the body and mind together are
consecrated, particularly as prayer sanctifies the eating of the body and blood. The words
of invocation, “This is my Body,” reflect the reality that “the Word of God, Who is both
God and the Word, coalesced with man’s nature” so “that by this communion with Deity
mankind might at the same time be deified.” This sanctification of the elements is
reflective of the transformation process that takes place in natural nourishment: as with
food, what is consumed is assimilated into the body. For Gregory, however, the Eucharist
is set apart as a meal because instead of the food being assimilated into the body, the
body and blood of Christ, sanctified by the Word, assimilates the believer into that
incorruptible body.250 As Penniman remarks, “For Gregory, Christians are saved and
perfected by what they eat and by the one who feeds them.”251
Lastly, it is necessary to clarify that Gregory does not believe that participation in
the sacraments on their own merit grants an effective change in life. The baptism of the
believer and the partaking of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist must coincide
with a change in the mode of life. Nyssen readily admits that the imitation of Christ
through the sacraments “does not admit of an exact and entire imitation, but it receives
now as much as it is capable of receiving.” Neither human nature nor the elements
themselves admit of a change in the case of the working of divine power, but Gregory is
John David Penniman, “Fed to perfection: mother’s milk, Roman family values, and the
transformation of the soul in Gregory of Nyssa” Church History 84.3 (September, 2015): 512.
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quick to address the reality that a change must truly occur. In the case of Christian
baptism, Gregory clarifies that,
if, when the bath has been applied to the body, the soul has not cleansed
itself from the stains of its passions and affections, but the life after
initiation keeps on a level with the uninitiate life, then, though it may be a
bold thing to say, yet I will say it and will not shrink; in these cases the
water is but water, for the gift of the Holy Ghost in no ways appears in
him who is thus baptismally born. 252
While in no way denying his earlier stance on their efficacy, Gregory maintains
that the attitude of the believer evinces the measure of one’s reception of the divine life.
Following the initiation and participation “the pursuit of anagogy dominates the life of
the regenerated Christian.” 253
Generally regarded as a practice employed outside the bounds of the organized
church, Gregory of Nyssa approached the ascetic life primarily under the influence of his
elder sister, Macrina. Although, as mentioned before, Basil’s ecclesiastical ambitions
overrode Gregory’s interest in the life of contemplation, it did not preclude his interest
and praise of askesis. For Gregory, asceticism meant the mortification of the sinful
tendencies of and a progression in the ever-ascending path towards the godly life. Indeed,
Gregory believed the ascetic life to be none other than the (truly) Christian life, involving
“fasting, chastity… renunciation of wealth, fame, and honor.”254 More concretely,
however, one of Nyssen’s chief emphases was the pursuit of “knowledge of the
incorruptible nature.”255 Although God’s nature was incomprehensible and unknowable,
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the call which Gregory aspired was one in which the nature of God as revealed in the
Son, through his names, and attributes, was the standard for imitation. This imitation, not
for one part of the human nature only, was to be lived out in one’s intellectual,
supernatural, and physical life – firmly within the limits of human nature established by
God.256
This meant a life of pursuing virtue in all regards, and indeed to do so without
end. As discussed before, participation in virtue is none other than participation in the
divine energies, and God, being infinite and without limit, is an object to be pursued into
eternity. 257 Gregory also believed that pursuing this virtuous life was an all-or-nothing
affair, in which if “one virtue is removed, the others are also eliminated.” Likewise, the
pursuit of vice in one area of one’s life contaminated the whole with perversity and
prevented further growth in pursuing the good.258 Therefore the ascetic life was one of
purgation first, cleansing oneself from the ills of the sinful nature, and of contemplation
and praxis second. This distinction in order, not meant to undercut the value in either
part, does preserve Gregory’s understanding of the pervasive and wicked effects of sin as
the fall into non-being for human persons.
Gregory’s understanding of ascetic practice was one of austerity and restraint. In
the Life of Moses he discussed the austerity of this way of life as being a departure from
Egypt, or the common pleasures of worldly life. The travelling equipment taken up by the
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Israelites protect them from the power of the evil one and preserve them on their course:
the “shoes are the self-controlled and austere life” that protects from the thorns of wouldbe sin. The pleasures of this life, represented by the tunic, are drawn up “as tightly as
possible” so as to allow the believer to “diligently finish the divine course.”259 In each of
these cases it is a health stricture of those elements present in worldly life that are
intended. As Cadenhead comments, Gregory “exhorts his readers to find the middle
ground between excess and deficiency in the practice of temperance.”260 In this way the
concern of one seeking the Christian life is one of being free from sin first, and pursuit of
righteousness at a pace which matches the capacity of the individual on their journey.
Progress in the journey is unmarked by measure but is attained by the
contemplative practice of prayer and by bodily ascetical practices. These two approaches,
working in tandem, provide steps on the upward journey towards life with God.
Corresponding again to the twofold nature of humanity, the practice of prayer is the
invitation for the believer to dwell in the “power and wisdom” of Christ. 261 Thereby the
Christian is able to intellectually ground themselves for the battle with sin and death. The
bodily practices, naturally, correspond to the physical life of Christians. Gregory’s
thought is that in the struggle against temptation and the power of the evil one, the body
can be controlled (e.g. by vows of chastity, renunciation of wealth) and thus consume the
“habitual passions.” This understanding is emphatically undergirded by Gregory’s
anthropology: rather than the body or the mind being the arena for sin on their own, or
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otherwise being the only arena in which the Christian combats evil, Gregory’s intent is to
have Christians be engaged and victorious on all fronts.
Conclusion
Complete victory of this sort, attained only by working under the power of God, is
perhaps the most immediate aspect of Gregory’s theological anthropology. Indeed, his
view of humanity is ultimately one of hope: first created in the image of God, destined
for a future of restoration of all persons into full imagehood and likeness, and empowered
toward the end by the dwelling of God with humanity.
The unified nature of Gregory’s theology and anthropology has implications for
theology today. An awareness of the connection between these strains of thought
provides a new lens through which a theologian might consider their convictions held in
other areas of study. For example, in the practical realm of theology, Gregory’s approach
to spiritual growth as a perpetual progression towards an infinite God differs greatly from
a less developed view in which human salvation involves only a static change of the
believer from “in rebellion” to “saved.” Gregory’s understanding of the human person
developing into the likeness of the image after which they were created is more true to
God’s character and his creative intent for humanity. Theosis is certainly a more nuanced
and complex view, allowing for greater expression of grace and love. Belief in an infinite
and comprehensible God obliterates measure in forgiveness, and calls the believer into
and ever closer walk with Him.
In terms of ecclesiology, the oneness of human nature, redeemed by Christ,
provides a theological explication for the scriptural directive of the “priesthood of all
believers.” In the church, as Gregory expresses, the image bestowed and the likeness
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sought after are also one, therefore the church should also be about the business of
overcoming those distinctions, such as race and gender, which are elements added onto
the image of God in humanity both within and outside of the body of Christ. Also, if one
perceives God as creating and sanctifying the creation through contact with his energies,
the view of the believer towards physical beauty, sacramental realities, and creation
generally must change. The same God that transforms and becomes incarnate is the same
God that created matter as a benefit to humanity’s salvific journey, transelements the
believer through common things like water, bread, and wine, and intended from the
beginning for all creation to be redeemed.
Furthermore, Gregory approach to the issues of gender and sexuality, while they
cannot be said to speak directly to issues of the twenty-first century, does offer another
way in which to engage modern conversations in society and the church. Today issues of
gender and sexuality have the tendency to dominate the conversations of theologians –
some preferring to maintain more traditional perspectives, and others pressing towards
new understandings (with a wide spectrum along which each finds their own place).
Gregory’s approach, while not standing aside and ignoring the issues, would be to rather
understand these concerns in a secondary place. Gregory, rather than being immersed in
these concerns, saw the spiritual life as being one of overcoming, transcending (think
particularly, of his view of Macrina) gender and sexuality. His place would be above the
spectrum, and not along it.
Lastly, Gregory’s view of God as the infinity which fulfills humanity, becoming
“all in all” is a hope to be considered. Perhaps Gregory’s lack of consistent, or dogmatic,
insistence can provide a framework for modern discussions. God, whose very nature is
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incomprehensible, has given humanity all things – an identity, a way of life, and a hope
for a world to come. Nyssen, using the images available to him through the scriptures,
traditions, and life of the church describes the eschaton with a multiplicity of images.
While not being settled into definitive belief, perhaps it is not too far to hope as Gregory
does in one of these visions and hope for the restoration of all.
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